Beginning in 1909, mainland Chinese governments routinely held elections, and lawmakers devoted considerable resources to writing and revising election laws. The earliest elections, held under the late Qing and the early Republic, utilized laws based on restricted electorates and indirect voting. By contrast, election laws designed during the provincial autonomy movement of the 1920s and the post-1927 Nationalist government featured direct voting in elections with (near-)universal adult suffrage. Each of these two systems of electoral law incorporated different elements of foreign electoral practice with concerns and ideas that arose from the experiences and ideals of late imperial Chinese political thought. The transition between these two systems highlights the surprising influence of the short-lived provincial autonomy movement on the legal structures of the centralized one-party states that followed.
Regulations" and "Provincial Assembly Election Regulations" limited the right to vote to male Chinese nationals over the age of twenty-five who were living in their province of ancestral residence and had either (1) managed a public welfare organization; (2) earned a degree from a Western-style middle school; (3) held a county-level shengyuan degree or higher from the recently abolished civil service examination system; (4) held a position in the civil or military bureaucracy; or (5) owned a minimum of 5,000 yuan of real estate or commercial capital. Certain behaviors resulted in disenfranchisement, including declarations of bankruptcy, illiteracy, coming from an "impure background," or using opium. Several occupations were also barred from participation; these included government officials, police, active-duty soldiers, monks or other clergy, and students. Those who were qualified to vote participated in an indirect, two-stage election process:
voters did not directly elect representatives but instead voted for an intermediate group of electors who would then be responsible for the final selection. Each county functioned as a single electoral district in the primary-stage election and was assigned a quota of primary-stage election winners. The winners of this election, determined by a mathematical formula that specified the minimum number of votes needed to win, gathered together with winners from other counties in the same prefecture, which formed the secondary-stage election district, and held another election. The winners of this secondary-stage election then became the new provincial assemblymen. No detailed Qing-era explanation of why this system was attractive survives.
Speculatively, part of its appeal may have rested in the similarity of its tiered structure of selection to the various levels of the pre-1905 imperial civil service examination system. The laws designed by the Qing would be used only once before the dynasty fell, but they survived the 1911 Revolution to become the foundation for the new republic's electoral laws for both the new national parliament and the legislatures of the various provinces. The fundamental structures of Qing electoral law-a restricted electorate voting in indirect elections-would be adopted by the new government of the Republic of China in a set of three interlocking laws adopted by the Provisional Senate during the summer of 1912.
2 Even the design of the ballot boxes and the ballots remained virtually the same (figures 1 and 2). Outside of the Provisional Senate, mainstream intellectual discourse about elections, as represented by thinkers such as
Kang Youwei (1858 Youwei ( -1927 and Liang Qichao (1873 -1929 , also tended to reaffirm these two basic principles (Liang 1999; Kang 1914) . Similarly, the provincial governments, such as Jiangsu's, that drafted their own election laws in the months before the national system proposed comparable systems (Jiangsu linshi shengyihui yijue 'an 1912) . The reasoning behind these decisions became evident during the course of Provisional Senate's 1912 deliberations. It overwhelmingly voted to maintain the system of two-stage, indirect elections (Zhengfu gongbao, July 13, 1912, fulu 9-15) . In a summary of the committee deliberations, one senator argued that "it is easier to select excellent, talented people through a system of indirect elections" (Zhengfu gongbao, July 10, 1912, fulu 18-19) . While the retention of indirect elections proved essentially uncontroversial, restrictions on suffrage sparked debate.
Seemingly all agreed that some sort of limitation on voting was natural: only a handful of senators voted in support of universal male suffrage (Zhengfu gongbao, July 13, 1912, fulu 15-19) . One senator explained that according to international practice, there were two basic principles governing restricted electorates: the laws should be designed to enfranchise "those of independent means" and "those with learning" (Zhengfu gongbao, July 25, 1912, fulu 21-27 ).
Yet there was also a broad consensus that franchise in a republic should be more widely shared than it had been under the emperor. The debate came to focus on how to widen the electorate while still restricting the vote to those who were presumed to have the correct background to exercise it responsibly. A number of prominent female activists outside of the government advocated vigorously (and with a significant degree of media savvy) for women's suffrage (see, for example, Edwards 2008) . Their advocacy of female voting rights, however, did not indicate support for universal adult suffrage, but rather for the inclusion of qualified women into the restricted electorate.
The final law to emerge from the Provisional Senate in 1912 restricted voting rights to adult men at least twenty-one years of age who had lived in the same voting district for at least two years and either (1) had graduated from a Western-style primary school (or held an "equivalent" qualification, such as a pre-1905 civil service examination degree); (2) owned 500 yuan or more in real estate; or (3) paid annual "direct taxes" to the central government in excess of 2 yuan. These qualifications, which were significantly less restrictive than the ones used during the Qing, laid the groundwork for a sizable expansion of the electorate from fewer than two million persons in 1909 to nearly forty-three million in 1912. As in 1909, those who used opium, were unable to write Chinese characters, had a mental illness, or had declared bankruptcy were disenfranchised, as were those engaged in occupations that had the potential to intimidate voters. Much like the Qing electoral law, the new law served to select an electorate that was assumed to have the correct intellectual and moral background to participate in politics.
The 1912 revisions to the Qing election law remained the bedrock of the Republican system until the rise of the Nationalist government in the 1920s. President Xu Shichang explicitly reaffirmed them in his call for elections in 1921, indicating their perceived legitimacy nearly a decade after the revolution. Yet by the time of Xu's presidency, a rival set of election laws, based on an alternative source of foreign inspiration and a different understanding of the Chinese past, began to eclipse this old consensus. Yang Chunlü's legal challenge to the 1921 elections in Shanghai and the public discussion about election law between Dewey and the Jiangsu Education Association's leaders crystallized a moment in which the indirect, restricted election system of the late Qing and early Republic lost its last remnants of credibility. In its place, lawyers, educators, and public intellectuals proposed a different kind of election law with a different goal.
Challenging Shanghai's Elections in Court, 1921
The lawsuit filed in Shanghai after the elections for the "New New Parliament" was not framed as a challenge to the system of indirect, restricted franchise elections, although those who sponsored the lawsuit would soon come to support alternative election systems. Taking a lead from Xu's November 1920 presidential declaration, which also urged political and judicial authorities to enforce election laws against corruption, a previously unknown local lawyer, Yang Chunlü, decided to monitor the primary-stage election in Shanghai County for compliance with national law. Yang's initial petition laid out a narrative of his experiences on election day.
Arriving at his assigned polling place, Yang witnessed three large groups, each made up of thirty to forty "suspicious-looking" people, rushing in and out of the polls. After these groups left for a break, Yang snatched up the nearly 250 polling station admission tickets that they had abandoned on the ground. Upset, he decided not to vote. Instead, he visited two other polls, where he collected several hundred additional discarded admission tickets. Some of these tickets, which were supposed to be individually produced for each voter at the time of registration, bore identical names; many more were found in sequential order according to their identification numbers (unlikely to happen naturally, as voters would presumably not appear at the polls in the exact order in which they had registered to vote weeks earlier). Together, these occurrences suggested to Yang a comprehensive effort to stuff ballot boxes and steal the election (Shenbao, 1921a) . Others, too, shared this suspicion (see figure 3 ).
Yang's account, the cornerstone of his lawsuit, was incomplete in two important respects.
First, Yang himself was a candidate in the primary-stage election and had garnered enough votes to be declared an "alternate winner" (houbu dangxuan), a position that Chinese election laws created in the event that the election's actual winners could not fulfill their role or were disqualified for fraud. Yang's lawsuit did not mention his personal stake in the election's results.
Second, although Yang cited Jiangsu Education Association leader Shen Enfu's account of witnessing election fraud as corroboration for his own claims, he never divulged any personal connections with Shen. While no evidence exists to show that the two men had met before the lawsuit, later newspaper accounts revealed that Yang and Shen had overlapping membership and leadership roles in a number of political organizations in the mid and late 1920s. While it is possible that Yang came to Shen's attention through this lawsuit, it seems more likely that Yang filed his case only after securing approval from this influential civic leader. Figure 3 . A political cartoon critical of election corruption. The stack of paper (perhaps ballots or polling station admission tickets) on the right is labeled "election" and is being sold to the two men on the left. Source: Shenbao, March 5, 1921, p. 14 ruled on April 15 that the county's primary-stage election was void. The thirty-one winners of that election, as announced in March, were stripped of their victories. The court justified this invalidation on the basis of improper voter registration practices and sloppy voter sign-in procedures, leaving Yang and Shen Enfu's claims of deliberate fraud unaddressed (Shenbao, 1921c) . Regardless, this verdict was remarkable, perhaps even unprecedented. Qing and Republican lawmakers had drafted procedures for electoral disputes and the invalidation of electoral results, but this seems to be the first time that such codes were used by a court of law to cancel the entire outcome of a particular vote.
Given its unusual nature and dramatic result, this trial and its verdict became the focus of public attention in Shanghai. Some found the whole affair distasteful-one Shenbao essayist, commenting on the crowds that flocked to the courtroom to listen to Yang's case, explained that he avoided the case because he preferred "fresh air" to the "stench of politics" (Laopu 1921, 16) .
After the verdict was announced on April 15, the Nationalist Party-backed Shanghai newspaper Guomin Ribao, which had long characterized the election as "illegal" in accord with the party line emanating from Guangzhou, celebrated the result. Defendants Yao and Lu, predictably, were less enthused and publicly accused Yang and the judge of conspiring to deny their election.
Other critics would later claim that jealousy, and a desire for mischief, motivated Yang's suit.
Many mocked those who had presumably won election by bribing voters only to find that their purchased positions had been seized by the court system (Shenbao 1921d; 1921e; Ne 1921, 11) .
The secondary-stage election for the region that included Shanghai was briefly postponed during the early phase of the trial, although primary-stage winners (including those from Shanghai whose election was about to be invalidated) continued to gather in Suzhou, where the secondary-stage vote was to take place. On April 4, over a week before the Shanghai verdict, these electors cast their votes for Jiangsu's parliamentary delegation. Perhaps this would have led to a second legal confrontation (as it was, Yang and the defendants continued to file motions well into the summer of 1921), but soon after the initial verdict was announced, the balance of forces in Beijing shifted again, ensuring that the just-elected "New New Parliament" would never be seated. Some hopeful would-be parliamentarians gathered in Beijing anyway, whereat the margins of warlord politics-they repeatedly petitioned in vain for someone to pay attention to their plight. This set of elections, the winners of which would never be seated in Parliament, served as a coda to the late Qing and early Republican electoral system. They were the last national parliamentary elections held using the indirect voting and restricted franchise structures inherited from the Qing. Provincial-level legislative elections based on this system died a slower death.
The July 1921 provincial legislative elections in Jiangsu would be the last in that province to use such laws, but several provinces in the northeast continued to use the system until the late 1920s.
In the wake of his hollow legal victory, Yang turned his attention to redesigning the institutions of the republic, beginning at the provincial level. He parlayed his fame into a set of relationships with prominent Shanghai professionals and activists, leading ultimately to a career in political advocacy.
Provincial Autonomy, the Shanghai Professional Elite, and Election Law Reform
In his April 1921 talk at the Jiangsu Education Association, Dewey briefly spoke in favor of provincial constitutions that would allow for the selection of "good representatives" as a potential solution to China's electoral problems. These charters, designed and enacted at the subnational level without regard to the Beijing authorities, had become an intellectual fad in 1920. Dewey promoted these documents in other public speeches, including during an earlier trip to Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province and a center of the autonomy movement. Many in his audiences across the country put faith in the power of newly designed provincial constitutions to mend the damaged fabric of the Chinese republic. In particular, the Shanghai professional, educational, and media communities embraced this push for redesigning the Republic of China as a federation of self-governing provinces (Bergere 1989, 217-227) . From the perspective of history, the 1920s "provincial autonomy movement" proved to have significantly greater discursive effects than practical political results. It did little to halt the increasingly intense civil wars of the mid-1920s and was unable to prevent the emergence of a highly centralized Nationalist state after 1927. Yet this movement did leave an important legacy for the governments that ruled China for the remainder of the twentieth century: a series of election laws that, for the first time in Chinese history, were based on universal adult suffrage and the direct election of representatives. The origins of the linkage between provincial autonomy and election law reform are obscure, although the fusion between these two causes occurred early in the movement's history.
Calls for reformed election laws had become increasingly common in 1920: in August of that year, the Shanghai Federation of Street Unions (Shanghai gelu shangjie zong lianhehui) demanded a directly elected national Citizens' Assembly based on universal adult suffrage, one of the earliest such publicized calls (Shenbao 1920a) . By October 10, direct elections and expanded suffrage had become foci of provincial autonomy activists in Hunan, and protesters in Changsha carried banners emblazoned with these demands (Duara 1995, 191) . Theorization of the linkage between autonomy and elections soon followed. An early exposition-published on the same day as the Changsha protests by Shanghai educational reformer, political activist, and Jiangsu Education Association member Huang Yanpei (1878-1965)-argued that two pairs of ideas defined the provincial autonomy movement. The first pair drew attention to the relationship between the province and the nation: the movement aimed to "smash centralized power" and to "eliminate the warlords." The second pair, however, focused on transformation of how elections would function: autonomy activists planned to "implement systems for direct popular expression" and "implement representation systems by occupational group" (Huang 1920, 46) . Although Huang expressed significant doubt about the viability of direct elections in China and said nothing about the scope of the electorate-the two issues that would come to define electionlaw writing during the provincial autonomy movement-his essay indicated that, for many, provincial autonomy was inextricably tied to a radical transformation of the existing system of voting. The link was made explicit a month later, in Shanghai-based scholar Zhang Taiyan's (1868 Taiyan's ( -1936 he declined. Ideas, plans, and policies circulated through these networks; this overlap accounts for the striking similarity of the provincial constitutions produced during this era. This was a national movement, centered in large measure in Shanghai, which embraced a particular rhetoric of local autonomy, rather than a series of local movements expressing local particularities.
This shared interest in new forms of elections was not necessarily directly linked to a desire for greater democratic accountability; instead, the goal was to reshape the connection between the state and the electorate. The goal of these new laws, which were intended to encourage mass participation in elections, was to mold citizens' attitudes and create a sense of belonging and identification with the newly reconstituted provincial governments. Although this particular vision of elections had also been inherent in Qing and early Republican elections, it now received a new emphasis and priority. Thus, these laws represented not only an interaction with a different aspect of a global discourse on elections but also a new appreciation for aspects of traditional Chinese political culture that emphasized the state's role in educating the people.
The indirect voting system was inadequate to this task. One Lou Mingyuan (dates unknown), writing in Shenbao in November 1920, claimed that indirect voting systems suffered from three major defects, one of which was that they allowed people to adopt a "lackluster sense of responsibility" toward elections. Although he did not advocate the immediate adoption of direct elections, the implication was clear (Lou 1920, 16) . Later Shenbao editorialists embraced this change. In 1921, a year after these initial discussions, an editorialist going by the pen name Silan praised the provincial constitutionalist movement's adoption of direct elections, noting that they could "result in [popular] interest in political participation rights" (Silan 1921, 20) . Taken together, this is an unusual series of justifications for direct elections. Direct elections were expected to inspire greater public interest in the political process and thus spread Republican political culture.
Translating these ideas into practice proved difficult. Although major provincial autonomy thinkers congregated in Shanghai, which was a part of Jiangsu Province until mid-1927, the attempts at implementing a provincial constitution in Jiangsu soon lagged behind those in Hunan, Guangdong, and Zhejiang. Two long-term members of the Jiangsu provincial legislature, Zhu Shaowen (dates unknown) and Chen Dayou (dates unknown), working at the behest of a loosely organized group in Shanghai, produced the first public proposal for an autonomous Jiangsu Province in late November 1920. This document was offered as a starting were intended to lay the foundations for a national reconciliation conference that would halt the slide toward increasingly intense civil war and devise a new organizational structure for the republic, involved drafting the conference's statement of purpose (Shenbao 1922b) . Yang also took part in other, less prominent groups that pursued related goals. Many came to nothing, such as the "Association for Promoting Provincial Federalism" (Liansheng zizhi cujin hui), which was founded by Yang, Zhang Taiyan, and other activists in August 1922 and soon disbanded (Shenbao 1922c ). Although such groups may have had other purposes that we can no longer discern, Yang himself appears to have been deeply committed to crafting the legal framework for a federalist China. In 1924, he participated in a second effort to create a Jiangsu provincial constitution and drafted the (never used) election law for the convention that would write it (Shenbao 1924a; 1924b; 1924c) A more surprising signal that direct elections had suddenly become a commonly accepted ideal was the October 10, 1923, promulgation of a new national constitution in Beijing. Amid the turmoil of that era, few saw this charter-the so-called "Cao Kun Constitution"-as legitimate.
Although it embraced many elements of earlier draft constitutions, it was finalized and approved by a reconvened rump of the "Old Parliament" that had been openly bribed by warlord Cao Kun where he would establish a regime in semi-exile. In this sense, as historian Chang Peng-yuan concluded, these elections were a "failure" (Chang 2007, 201-205 ). Yet they were also a culmination of a particular way of thinking about elections as an educational experience intended for all adult citizens. This Nationalist attempt to institutionalize ideas originating in the provincial autonomy movement failed, but its legacies would bear fruit after 1949 in Taiwan and, especially, on the mainland.
Conclusion: An Incomplete Legacy
At first glance, Chinese elections may appear to be nothing more than a footnote in twentieth-century history; military coups and armed revolutionary politics, rather than voting, produced the nation's leadership class. However, election law was a vital area of intellectual debate in the Republican period. The consensus at the republic's birth, inherited from late Qing lawmakers, held that indirect elections with a restricted electorate could result in the selection of talented and moral people for office. Although critics savaged the actuality of Republican elections held under these laws, they focused their attention on the (flawed) moral character of candidates and voters, rather than on proposals for systemic change. By the early 1920s, catalyzed by the provincial autonomy movement, this consensus had disintegrated. In its place, elite intellectuals, urban professionals, and civic activists proposed a vision of direct elections coupled with universal adult suffrage. These elections, intended to engage the populace more directly in politics, were supposed to function as a form of ritualistic political education that would bring the average person into contact with the symbols and ideas of the new state. Before This system of elections constituted the major legacy of the provincial autonomy movement for the legal structure of the Chinese party-states in the mid and late twentieth century. Mass suffrage elections and universal adult suffrage grew out of a political movement that was separate from, and independent of, the Nationalist and Communist parties. Scholars, particularly Jean Chesneaux and Prasenjit Duara, have pointed to the dual nature of the provincial autonomy movement as focused on both decentralization and democratic governance (Chesneaux 1969) . The post-1927 Nationalist party-state rejected the first of these in principle and consigned the second to a distant future after an unspecified period of tutelage. Yet, without attribution, the new government also incorporated the legal structures of the provincial autonomy election laws into its own conception of a post-tutelary state.
This legacy, however, can be measured only in textual production, rather than in concrete political action. Despite all of the effort devoted to drafting provincial constitutions in multiple provinces, only Hunan's constitution was enacted. In March 1922, the government of that province held the lone pre-1927 election based on direct voting and universal adult suffrage-yet only scattered evidence from that election survives to the present day. In the absence of documented provincial autonomy elections against which the movement's electoral ideals could be tested, the surviving legal codes left behind a series of unresolved problems within their blueprints for reform. The most significant of these was encapsulated by Yang Chunlü's career.
Though he came to be supportive of the new electoral system, he never addressed how it would solve the issues raised by his original lawsuit. His challenge to the 1921 elections focused on systemic corruption within the late Qing and early Republican electoral system. If those laws could be subverted, could the new ones proposed by provincial autonomy activists not also be?
How, exactly, would participation in direct elections inspire the newly enfranchised populace to the level of civic virtue that Yang and others expected of it? How would the people be trained in the practice of their new voting rights?
The mass suffrage, direct elections held during the Nationalist era provided one possible solution to these questions. Voting was accompanied by an improvised civics curriculum in which voters were introduced (many, perhaps, for the first time) to the symbols and slogans of the Republican state. Casting ballots was part of a ceremony of citizenship, a ritual to bind the people and the regime, rather than an exercise in determining leadership. Fraud was controlled by the elimination of competition. Before the voting began in 1947, the Nationalist Party had already selected winners for each district; party officials barely attempted to disguise this fact (although they were not always able to enforce their decisions). In the hands of the Nationalists, neither of these strategies proved successful at "repairing" the "indifference" toward elections that concerned Dewey's interlocutor in 1921. If anything, the 1947 elections intensified these problems. Both of these strategies, however, would be enthusiastically adopted by the Chinese Communist Party, though pursued with a thoroughness that would have astounded both the provincial autonomy activists and the Nationalists, when the new People's Republic of China organized its own direct, mass suffrage elections for local People's congresses in the 1950s.
Elections were meaningful parts of Chinese political and intellectual history, even if none of China's twentieth-century leaders could ever claim to rule by an electoral mandate. Debates over the proper structure for elections reflected evolving ideas about how the law and the institutions it created could be used to affect human behavior. This evolution crossed several standard chronological divisions in modern Chinese history; it blurred the difference between the late Qing and the early republic, as well as the provincial autonomy movement and the post-1927 Nationalist period. It provides one example of the unexpected borrowing of legislation and legal ideas across regimes that characterized the development of law in early twentieth-century China. 
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Notes
1
See "Ge sheng ziyiju zhangcheng" (Provincial assembly regulations) and "Ziyiju yiyuan xuanju zhangcheng" (Provincial assembly voting regulations), in Liu (1935, 11436-11442 The best introduction to the provincial autonomy movement in English remains Chesneaux (1969) . 5
The text of the oath can be found in the Nationalist government's 1930 Oath Regulations (Xuanshi tiaoli) (Guomin zhengfu gongbao 1930b) and Organic Law for Cities (Shi zuzhifa) (Guomin zhengfu gongbao 1930a), rather than in the election law itself.
